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Rhetoric and Reality
"[W]hile investor protection remains a paramount interest....
I. INTRODUCTION
Amidst all the recent publicity surrounding government action in com-
bating corporate wrongdoing (including the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2 and the prosecution of the top brass at Enron3 and other
scandal-ridden companies4), little public attention has been focused on a
dramatic overhaul of the United States securities regulations. The re-
forms were adopted in December 2005 as revised and new rules promul-
gated under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).5 Among other
things, the reforms provide that companies contemplating an offering of
securities will be able to communicate with potential investors much
more freely than has been possible in the past.6 In the past, the securities
laws have protected the market against sales campaigns that attempt to
lure investors into buying securities before basic quality information
about the company and the offering have been submitted to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) and distributed to the market.7
Those strict regulations are now largely gone and "conditioning the mar-
1. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722,44,731 (Aug. 3,2005).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see also Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-
Oxley Enough?, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 856-57 (2003) (criticizing the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act for doing too much and too little: too much regulation that is costly and not helpful in
reducing fraud, and too little in terms of real reforms that might have helped combat
fraud).
3. See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller, Gary McWilliams & Ann Davis, Lay, Skilling Are
Convicted of Fraud, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at Al.
4. WorldCom and Tyco are just two examples of high-profile companies to have
massive frauds uncovered and their top management prosecuted for its role in those
schemes. See, e.g., Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy;
Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al. WorldCom eventually admitted to
overstating its profits by more than seven billion dollars through accounting irregularities.
See Jared Sandberg & Susan Pulliam, WorldCom Revision Tops $7 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 9, 2002, at A3. Tyco admitted to overstating profits by $135 million and to extending
and then forgiving loans to key corporate executives in an amount close to one hundred
million dollars. Further, Tyco executives were accused of looting close to six hundred
million dollars from the company. See Alex Berenson, Tyco Troubles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2002, § 4, at 2; see also Anthony Bianco, William Symonds & Nanette Byrnes, The Rise
and Fall of Dennis Kozlowski, Bus. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 64, 65, 68; Monica Gagnier,
Kozlowski's Comeuppance, Bus. WK., Oct. 3, 2005, at 48, 48.
5. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,722.
6. See id. at 44,731-32.
7. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
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ket" for an upcoming sale of new securities (something the SEC previ-
ously attempted to prevent) is now permissible.8
These reforms have been made in the name of improving efficiency and
access to capital for corporate America.9 At the same time, I will argue,
investors are being left more vulnerable to the manipulations of corpo-
rate wrongdoers. The SEC called for comments on the reforms when
they were proposed."' Most commentators on the reforms seemed gener-
ally pleased with these deregulatory reforms." However, such a position
seems to represent the interests of issuers and others who participate in
making securities offerings (all of whom are delighted by the deregula-
tion represented by the reforms), not the SEC's more traditional con-
stituency, investors. 2
In its publication presenting the reforms, the SEC is explicit that effi-
ciency is one of its goals. However, implicit in the reforms seems to be
an unquestioning faith in the efficient capital market hypothesis. The
reforms appear premised upon that hypothesis-that as long as informa-
tion about a corporation has been made public in some way, then inves-
tors need not receive that information directly but will be protected by
the market's efficient absorption of that information. Despite the fact
that the new reforms are clearly predicated on this hypothesis, it is never
named and no evidence is cited in the SEC release to support the effi-
ciency of the markets, other than a general sense that it must be true. 4
The new regulations are truly sweeping. Specifically, the reforms affect
two broad areas of securities regulations: (i) communications with inves-
tors during a securities offering," and (ii) offering procedures. 16 Parts II
and III of this Article will analyze and critique the reforms in that order.
Part IV will scrutinize the results of the new reforms based on liability for
issuers and other market participants. In Part V, the Article will directly
call into question whether the SEC has, in fact, exceeded its rulemaking
8. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,734.
9. See id. at 44,725 (explaining that the reforms should "[m]ake the capital formation
process more efficient").
10. Id. at 44,724 & n.18 (stating that the SEC received over 130 comment letters); see
also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Comments on Proposed Rule: Securities Offering Re-
form, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73804.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Comments on Proposed Rule].
11. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,724.
12. See id. A survey of those comment letters shows that many, if not most, of those
letters come from large law firms and investment banks (groups that are typically regu-
lated by the SEC) and not from groups that would effectively advocate for investor con-
cerns. See Comments on Proposed Rule, supra note 11. One notable exception to this is a
letter from the American Association of Retired Persons. See id.
13. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,725.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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authority by altering so dramatically the very character of the regulatory
regime that the Securities Act sought to construct. Finally, in Part VI, the
Article will make a call for a return to investor protection as the top pri-
ority of the SEC and its rulemaking.
More specifically, Part II of this Article will discuss the virtual elimina-
tion of the restrictions on communications during the three phases of an
offering of securities under the Securities Act: (i) the pre-filing period,
(ii) the waiting period, and (iii) the post-effective period. In the past, the
SEC viewed communications during an offering period with great suspi-
cion. SEC releases referred to the fear that promoters of securities would
attempt to "condition the market" in order to increase the sales price of
their securities. 17 The restrictions on communications are now largely
gone as a result of the recent reforms.8 The reason for the change prof-
fered by the SEC in its adopting release is that restricting such informa-
tion was becoming increasingly "unnecessary."' 9 Earlier in that same
release, the SEC essentially sets forth its new view that investors should
get more information, even if that information is unregulated and may
indeed serve to "condition the market."2 This new logic provides sup-
port for the SEC's deregulatory reforms. Nonetheless, the logic seems to
cater to corporate interests and to ignore the real needs of investors for
protection against the market conditioning described above. This new
stance also seems to be a complete reversal of the SEC's historical posi-
tion on this point.
Part III of this Article will move on to discuss some of the reforms that
are directly related to the registration process-the process by which a
corporation registers its securities with the SEC so that the corporation
can sell those securities to the public. As a result of the reforms, "well-
known seasoned issuers" (WKSIs) are now able to use a new shelf regis-
tration procedure known as "automatic shelf registration. 2 ' An auto-
matic shelf need not be reviewed by the SEC to be declared effective.2 It
will be effective upon filing, and thereafter, the issuer can sell any securi-
ties by filing an amended registration statement specifying the securities
that will be offered.2 With automatic shelf registration, the base prospec-
tus need not identify any specific quantity or type of security to be sold.
2 4
The prospectus must only provide a basic amount of information about
17. See id. at 44,737.
18. See id. at 44,734.
19. Id. at 44,791.
20. Cf. id. at 44,737.
21. Id at 44,777.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id
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the company)5 This new automatic shelf registration, combined with the
new ability to engage in free communications, results in a regime where a
WKSI can essentially sell securities whenever it wishes to do so and can
advertise for the sale of those securities on a virtually unrestricted basis.
The combination of these two reforms creates an entirely different offer-
ing regime than the one contemplated by section 5 of the Securities Act.
Part IV of this Article will discuss the implications of the new reforms
on the liability of participants in a securities offering. Historically, the
bulk of information that could be communicated to investors during the
marketing of a new offering of securities came from the registration
statement, and was therefore subject to the strict liability provisions of
section 11 of the Securities Act.26 Section 11 provides that any purchaser
of a security in a registered offering can sue "every person" involved in
creating a registration statement for any false information contained
therein. Further, such authors are all jointly and severally liable for any-
thing that is misleading in the registration statement 8 There are no addi-
tional conditions to presenting a case under section 11 as there are with
other anti-fraud provisions. 9 The threat of heightened liability meant
heightened care was given to the preparation of that document by issuing
participants. The new reforms dismantle this system by allowing free
communications in the pre-filing and waiting periods that will not be part
of the registration statement, and therefore not subject to either the
heightened liability of section 11 or the consequent heightened level of
care used in their preparation.0
Part V of this Article will assess more directly than the previous sec-
tions whether the SEC has indeed exceeded its rulemaking authority by
so dramatically recrafting the securities regulatory regime in the United
States. This section will look at two questions in this regard. The first
question is whether Congress delegated too much legislative authority to
the SEC when it specified that the SEC was authorized to exempt anyone
and anything from the Securities Act as long as it was "in the public in-
31
terest" and was "consistent with" investor protection. While uncom-
mon, the federal courts have declared certain broad grants of authority to
25. Id. at 44,778.
26. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
27. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
28. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f).
29. Compare Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (providing no additional
conditions for a suit to be brought), with Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (applying to "any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap
agreement"), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006) (making the "[e]mployment of manipulat-
ive and deceptive devices... unlawful").
30. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); Securities Act Release No.
33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,791.
31. See Securities Act of 1933 § 28,15 U.S.C. § 77z-3.
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administrative agencies to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.32 Second, this section examines whether, even if the grant of au-
thority is not overly broad, the SEC has exceeded the power granted to it
by Congress. The granting language authorizes the SEC to make excep-
tions to the Securities Act33 but, as the previous sections have detailed,
the reforms adopted by the SEC virtually remake the Securities Act.
This might indeed be more than an administrative agency should be al-
lowed to do.
Finally, Part VI of this Article will conclude with an overall discussion
of how, throughout the new reforms, the SEC has given top priority to
efficiency and deference to corporate interests while sacrificing the inter-
ests of investors. Despite the fact that the SEC has officially announced
that it believes that the new reforms will indeed enhance investor inter-
ests, the SEC gives little evidence to back up those claims. 34 The Article
will conclude with a call for renewed scrutiny of the efficient capital mar-
ket hypothesis and a renewed vigilance on the part of the SEC to make
sure that investor protection is reality, not merely rhetoric.
II. MORE COMMUNICATION ALLOWED DURING OFFERINGS
The Securities Act specifically restricted communications between
those people who were involved in issuing new securities and investors. 5
The restrictions were designed to ensure that investors received only
quality information about a new offering of securities and the company
issuing those securities in order for the investor to make a reasonable
decision about whether or not to invest. 6 The information allowed to be
disseminated to investors was typically company- and offering-specific
information that was registered with the SEC before being disseminated
to investors. The new reforms significantly alter those regulations, al-
lowing far more open communications to potential investors with an en-
tirely lower level of accountability for statements. 8
The Securities Act's original restrictions recognized specific periods of
time that occur in the life of a securities offering, and the regulations
were tailored to those time periods.39 In accordance with the nature of a
securities offering, there is: (i) the time period before a new securities
offering is first filed with the SEC (the pre-filing period); (ii) the time
32. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).
33. See Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3.
34. See Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,731, 44,791.
35. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-3 (1933); S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1-2 (1933).
37. See Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j.
38. See infra Part IV (discussing the lower level of accountability).
39. See Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,731.
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period after the filing of the registration statement but before the SEC
has finished its review of the registration statement and declared the of-
fering effective (the waiting period); and (iii) the time period after the
offering has been declared effective (the post-effective period). This sec-
tion will discuss the impact of the SEC's recent reforms regarding com-
munications in each of these periods and will demonstrate that the new
reforms are indeed allowing much freer communications with a much
lower level of accountability.
A. The Pre-Filing Period
This section will first describe the way in which communications were
restricted during the pre-filing period before the recent enactment of the
securities reforms. This section will then describe how the recent reforms
have largely removed those regulations to dramatically expand the uni-
verse of permitted communications during the pre-filing period.
(1) Historically, Gun-Jumping Was Prohibited
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act specifically made it unlawful for any
person to offer to sell or buy securities before a registration statement
had been filed with the SEC.4° Those efforts have come to be known as
"gun-jumping" and have generally been strictly prohibited until the re-
cent SEC reforms.' Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act defined "offer"
as broadly as it could to "include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for
value." 42 Section 5(c) and section 2(a)(3), taken together, meant that
communications between anyone involved in an upcoming offering of
securities and potential investors were essentially forbidden. This ap-
plied equally to oral and written communications.4 ' All forms of gun-
jumping were forbidden. The only carve-out from the definition of "of-
fer" was for any negotiations or agreement between an issuer and its un-
derwriters. 44 That carve-out was necessary, of course, for the issuer to
plan the offering. However, even the Securities Act kept that carve-out
narrow and insisted that the negotiations or agreements take place be-
tween the issuer and an underwriter that would be in privity with it (as
opposed to underwriters or dealers who would later be recruited by the
lead underwriters to participate in the offering).45
40. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
41. See Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,731.
42. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3); see also Diskin v. Lomas-
ney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 875 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Cavanagh, 1 F. Supp. 2d 337, 368
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
43. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 2(a)(3), 5(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(3), 77e(c).
44. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3).
45. Id.
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(a) SEC Releases and Case Law Clearly Prohibited Gun-Jumping
The SEC made its position on communications during the pre-filing pe-
riod clear in a series of cases and SEC releases. 6 In 1957, the SEC issued
Securities Act Release No. 33-3844, in which it discussed the primacy of
regulating communications in the periods of time during an offering that
47precede effectiveness. In that release, the SEC stated that the express
language and legislative history of the Securities Act prohibit any "public
sales campaign prior to the filing of a registration statement." 48 This pro-
hibition was designed to promote a basic purpose of the Securities Act:
"to require the dissemination of adequate and accurate information con-
cerning issuers and their securities in connection with the offer and sale
of securities to the public."49 But Release No. 3844 went on to describe
how publicity efforts could "contribute to conditioning the public mind or
arousing public interest in the issuer" even if not specifically made in
terms of an express offer.0
As early as 1959, the SEC took up the issue in In re Carl M. Loeb,
Rhoades & Co." In that case, the SEC set forth its position, clearly stat-
ing that the prohibitions on communications during the pre-filing period
were essential as "Congress was concerned lest inadequate or misleading
information be used in connection with the distribution of securities., 52
The SEC continued to discuss its role in that regard:
We were directed to pursue a vigorous enforcement policy to
prevent [gun-jumping] from happening. In obedience to this
mandate we have made clear our position that the statute prohib-
its issuers, underwriters and dealers from initiating a public sales
campaign prior to the filing of a registration statement by means
of publicity efforts which, even though not couched in terms of an
express offer, condition the public mind or arouse public interest
in the particular securities.53
46. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 573-76 (2d Cir. 1970);
In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 848-55 (1959); Guidelines for Release
of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in Registration, Securities Act Release
No. 33-5180, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,506, 16,506-07 (Aug. 21, 1971); Publication of Information
Prior to or After Filing and Effective Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 33-5009, 34 Fed. Reg. 16,870, 16,870-71 (Oct. 18, 1969); Statement of the Com-
mission Relating to Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a
Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33-3844, 22 Fed. Reg. 8359, 8359-61
(Oct. 24, 1957).
47. Securities Act Release No. 33-3844,22 Fed. Reg. at 8359.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Loeb, Rhoades, 38 S.E.C. at 848-54.
52. Id. at 850.
53. Id. (footnote omitted).
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This conditioning of investors to arouse interest was identified as being as
prohibited as an outright offer. 4
As time went on, the business community grew more concerned about
what information businesses could disclose in the pre-filing period, and
what information would be considered as a sales effort designed to condi-
tion the market.5 Reporting companies, in fact, had duties under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to disclose certain items
of material significance to their businesses.56 And so, the SEC published
Securities Act Release No. 33-5009 in 1969 and Securities Act Release
No. 33-5180 in 1971. 57 Both of these releases described what types of in-
formation would be considered to condition the market and what types of
information a business could rightly disclose in the ordinary course of its
operations and pursuant to its duties under the Exchange Act.58 Release
No. 5009 reiterated a position it had taken in the Loeb, Rhoades case ten
years earlier: "[The] 'flow of normal corporate news, unrelated to a sell-
ing effort for an issue of securities is natural, desirable and entirely con-
sistent with the objectives of... the federal securities laws.', 59 However,
the SEC was undeterred that selling efforts were still prohibited and be-
lieved that the conflict between a business' requirements to disclose ma-
terial events under the Exchange Act but refrain from any selling efforts
for a new securities offering was "more apparent than real." 60 The re-
lease specifically authorized the dissemination of factual information that
did not include predictions or opinions.6 Release No. 5180 went further
to itemize a list of permitted topics that a business might discuss freely
without fear that such communications would be deemed a selling ef-
fort.62 On that list were topics such as normal advertising, periodic re-
porting, and other typical business communications.63
54. Id at 851.
55. See Publication of Information Prior to or After Filing and Effective Date of Reg-
istration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33-5009, 34 Fed. Reg. 16,870, 16,870 (Oct.
18, 1969).
56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2000).
57. Guidelines for Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in Regis-
tration, Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,506, 16,506-07 (Aug. 21, 1971);
Securities Act Release No. 33-5009, 34 Fed. Reg. at 16,870.
58. Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, 36 Fed. Reg. at 16,507; Securities Act Release
No. 33-509, 34 Fed. Reg. at 16,870.
59. Securities Act Release No. 33-5009, 34 Fed. Reg. at 16,870 (quoting In re Carl M.
Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843,853 (1959)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, 36 Fed. Reg. at 16,507.
63. Id.
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(b) Narrow Exceptions Allowed Limited Communications
In 1969, the SEC went so far as to conduct a study on the prohibition
against gun-jumping and concluded that the provisions were sound.64
However, the study did result in the SEC promulgating a series of rules
(Rules 135, 137, 138, and 139) that allowed particular exceptions to the
prohibition against communications in the pre-filing period (as well as
the waiting period).65
(i) Rule 135: Basic Information Can Be Published
Rule 135 was designed to give issuers and other parties involved in a
sale of securities comfort that notices that simply told the public that
there would be an upcoming sale of securities were permitted.66 The rule
itemized exactly what type of information about an upcoming offering
was permitted but specifically prohibited information about the intended
underwriters. 67 This was done so that investors would not jump the gun
and attempt to contact selling agents before the information required by
the SEC to be in a registration statement had been filed and then dis-
seminated to potential investors.
(ii) Rule 137: Non-Participating Broker or Dealer Can Publish Re-
search
Rule 137 made a clear exception to the prohibition against communica-
tions for brokers or dealers who were not participating in an upcoming
offering.6 Under Rule 137, such brokers or dealers could publish their
research information pertaining to the securities to be offered so long as
three conditions were satisfied.69 First, the company issuing the securities
had to be a reporting company under the Exchange Act.7° Second, the
broker or dealer needed to make such reports in the ordinary course of
its business.7' Third, the broker or dealer could not receive any consid-
eration for making its report from any of the participants involved in the
securities offering (other than a regular subscription fee or normal pur-
chase price for the research report). 72 Rule 137 was designed to promote
and encourage ordinary research about companies that were already pub-
64. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEC DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL
OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS: THE WHEAT
REPORT 16 (1969).
65. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.135, 230.137-.139 (2005).
66. See id. § 230.135.
67. Id. § 230.135(a)(2)(v).
68. Id. § 230.137.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id. § 230.137(c).
72. Id. § 230.137(b).
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lic and ensure that such research would continue throughout a registra-
tion of new securities. The rule was careful, however, to apply only to
those brokers or dealers who had no special financial interest in the up-
coming offering, since they were not participating in the offering. The
theory was that such research could only help the market understand
more about the company issuing the securities and the securities them-
selves and was not likely to result in any market manipulations because
the authors of those reports had no financial incentive to mislead.
(iii) Rule 138: Participating Broker or Dealer Can Publish Re-
search on Securities Not Being Offered
Rule 138 provided another exception from the ban on communications
for brokers or dealers with respect to an upcoming offering.73 The Rule
138 exception applied to brokers and dealers who were participating in
the upcoming offering.74 Despite this participation, Rule 138 essentially
allowed those brokers and dealers to continue to publish their ordinary
research about securities of the issuer that were not of the type being
offered.75 Therefore, if the company was issuing common stock or any-
thing convertible into common stock, the brokers and dealers could con-
tinue to publish their ordinary reports about the company's fixed income
securities or preferred stock.6 Likewise, if the upcoming issuance was of
fixed income securities or preferred stock, then the brokers and dealers
could continue to publish their ordinary research reports about the com-
pany's common stock.77 In order for brokers and dealers to use this rule,
the company issuing the securities must be eligible to register its securi-
ties on Form S-3 or F-3.78 Once again, the SEC was attempting to en-
courage market research by brokers and dealers who were not reporting
about an issuance of securities in which they had any special financial
interest. Accordingly, there should have been little risk of market ma-
nipulation by these communications.
73. Id. § 230.138.
74. Id. § 230.138(a).
75. See id. § 230.138(b).
76. Id. § 230.138(a).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 230.138(c). The analysis of whether a company is eligible to file on these
forms is complicated and must be done in strict accordance with those forms but generally
means that, at a minimum, the issuer has been a reporting company under the Exchange
Act for at least a year. See S.E.C. Forms S-3, F-3 (2006).
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(iv) Rule 139: Participating Broker or Dealer Can Publish Its
Regular Reports
Rule 139 also provided an exemption from the prohibition on commu-
nications.79 Rule 139 took the exemptions found in Rules 137 and 138 a
step further. Rule 139 applied to brokers and dealers who were partici-
pating in an upcoming issuance of securities, allowing those brokers and
dealers to continue to issue their research reports about those securities,
provided that one of two sets of requirements were met.80 First, the ex-
emption would apply if the issuing company was of a sufficient size and
stature,81 and the broker or dealer published such reports with reasonable
regularity in the ordinary course of its business."' Second, the Rule 139
safe harbor would apply if the issuer was a reporting company under the
Exchange Act and the research report: (i) was issued regularly in the
normal course of the broker or dealer's business;83 (ii) referred to a sub-
stantial number of other companies,84 giving no greater prominence to the
issuing company than to the other companies referenced in the report;
and (iii) included information on the issuer that was similar to a previous
publication by the broker or dealer.86
With Rule 139, as with Rules 137 and 138, the SEC was attempting to
encourage and support the continued publication of research reports on
companies that are already followed by the markets. At the same time,
these SEC rules attempted to ensure that no participant in the offering
inappropriately conditioned the market to inflate the price of the securi-
ties being offered. 7
(2) Reforms Repeal Prohibition
In its reforms, the SEC has virtually abolished its prohibitions on com-
munications in the pre-filing period for large well known companies, as
well as significantly reducing those prohibitions for all other companies.8
The reforms categorize issuing companies essentially in a spectrum from
large, well-known companies, to companies that are new to the public
markets. The reforms then take a different approach to those different
categories of issuers. This section will describe the categories that have
79. 17 C.F.R. § 230.139.
80. Id.
81. Id. § 230.139(a).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 230.139(b)(1)(i).
84. Id. § 230.139(b)(1)(ii).
85. Id. § 230.139(b)(2).
86. Id. § 230.139(b)(3).
87. See id. § 230.137-.139.
88. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,734 (Aug. 3, 2005).
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been developed and then discuss the regulations (or relaxation of regula-
tions) that now apply to the pre-filing period.
(a) Issuer Categories Expand to Include WKSIs
The SEC uses four categories of issuer in its reforms: (1) the well-
known seasoned issuer, (2) the seasoned issuer, (3) the unseasoned Ex-
change Act reporting issuer, and (4) the non-reporting issuer.89 The
WKSI is a new category that the SEC has never used before. The new
reforms give WKSIs the most flexibility to communicate to the public
without restriction. An issuing company qualifies as a WKSI if it has
been a reporting company under the Exchange Act for at least a year, is
timely with the reports it files under the Exchange Act, and either: (i) has
a worldwide market value of all of its common equity held by non-
affiliates of at least seven hundred million dollars, or (ii) has issued in the
past three years at least an aggregate principal amount of nonconvertible
securities, other than common equity, of one billion dollars.9° The SEC
has created this category of issuer because it believes that such companies
are widely followed by the public markets and, therefore, deserve to have
communications requirements relaxed. 91
In establishing the thresholds used to determine which companies
would be considered WKSIs, the SEC relied on statistical data from its
Office of Economic Analysis.92 The statistics are staggering. According
to the SEC itself, in 2004, WKSIs represented approximately 30% of all
listed issuers in the United States, but they "accounted for about 95% of
U.S. equity market capitalization ... [and] more than 96% of the total
debt raised in registered offerings over the past eight years by issuers
listed on a major exchange or equity market."93 In accordance with these
statistics, it is clear that relaxation of the regulations on WKSIs applies to
nearly the entire market. So, despite the fact that there are indeed four
categories of issuers and different regulations applying to each, the cate-
gory that is truly the most important and deserves the most attention
when analyzing the reforms are the regulations that apply (or, as a matter
of fact, have been eliminated) to WKSIs.
The other categories of issuers used in the reforms are seasoned issuers
that are required to file reports under the Exchange Act (but do not qual-
89. Id. at 44,726, 44,730-31.
90. Id. at 44,727. Note that the requirements also demand that the issuer not be an
"ineligible issuer" as that term is now defined in 17 C.F.R. § 230.405. Id. at 44,727 & n.45.
Among other things, an ineligible issuer is one who is late with its reporting obligations
under the Exchange Act or has declared bankruptcy during the previous three years. 17
C.F.R. § 230.405 (2006).
91. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,726-27.
92. Id. at 44,727-28,44,728 n.51.
93. Id. at 44,727.
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ify as WKSIs), unseasoned issuers that are required to file reports under
the Exchange Act, and issuers that are not required to file reports under
the Exchange Act. Issuers are considered seasoned if they are eligible to
report on Form S-3 or Form F-3.94 That determination is complicated and
must be done in strict accordance with those forms but generally means
that the issuer has at least seventy-five million dollars of outstanding se-
curities held by non-affiliates or has a certain minimum investment grade
rating on its debt securities. 95 Unseasoned issuers are those issuers that
are required to file reports under the Exchange Act but do not meet the
criteria to be either WKSIs or seasoned issuers.96 The final category ap-
plies to all other issuers, including those that have chosen to voluntarily
file reports under the Exchange Act but are not required to do so.9'
(b) New Rule 163: Free WKSI Communication Pre-Filing
Under new Rule 163, WKSIs are allowed to communicate freely
throughout the pre-filing period. 98 Both oral and written communications
are allowed.99 This is a complete reversal from the previous regulatory
regime described above. The SEC has stated that such companies are so
widely followed that they should not be prevented from continuing any
on-going communications with the investment community.'0° To restrict
pre-filing communications, the SEC now states, would be an unnecessary
burden on these companies. 11 It bears repeating the SEC's position in
Loeb, Rhoades, advocating a "vigorous enforcement policy to prevent"
gun-jumping.'0 2 Admittedly, the Loeb, Rhoades case is from 1959. None-
theless, with the adoption of this new Rule 163, the SEC seems to have
changed its position in this regard entirely.
(c) New Rule 163A: Free Communications Prior to Thirty Days Be-
fore Filing
Rule 163A provides that for all issuers, no communication will be
deemed a violation of the gun-jumping provisions of the Securities Act if
the communication occurs prior to thirty days before the filing of a regis-
94. Id. at 44,730.
95. See S.E.C. Forms S-3, F-3 (2006).
96. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,731.
97. See id. at 44,730-31.
98. 17 C.F.R. § 230.163 (2006); see also Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed.
Reg. at 44,734.
99. 17 C.F.R. § 230.163(a); see also Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
at 44,734.
100. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,734.
101. Id.
102. In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 850 (1959); see supra text ac-
companying note 53.
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tration statement.' 3 There is one condition on this exemption-the
communication cannot specifically refer to the upcoming offering of se-
curities.' 4 Beyond that restriction, any market conditioning that occurs
prior to that thirty-day window before filing is now entirely legal. The
SEC's reasoning is that the thirty-day window will allow for a cooling-off
period for any marketing hype that a company has created prior to that
window.0 5 Again, this change seems out of sync with the SEC's histori-
cally vigilant anti-gun-jumping position.
(d) New Rule 168. Reporters Can Publish Regular Facts and Forecasts
Under the new Rule 168, all reporting issuers-WKSIs, seasoned, and
unseasoned issuers-are given an exemption from restrictions against
communications that are essentially regularly released "factual business
information or forward-looking information."'06 The factual business
information exemption was already a part of SEC practice in accordance
with SEC Release No. 5009 and No. 5180 described above."" However,
the forward-looking aspect of the new rule has been more controversial.
Forward-looking statements do exactly what the SEC had historically not
wanted issuers to do before filing a registration statement: condition the
market to purchase the securities to be issued. It is true, as the SEC
points out in its release adopting the reform, that the SEC has reversed
this position in a number of ways to encourage companies to give for-
ward-looking information in certain circumstances. °8 Such information,
however, was never allowed to be disclosed during the pre-filing period
by a company planning an upcoming offering.1 9
(e) New Rule 169: Even Non-Reporters Can Publish Facts
Even non-reporting issuers are given flexibility with respect to the
regular release of factual business communications. New Rule 169 allows
any issuer, including an issuer that is not obligated to file reports under
the Exchange Act, to issue regular business communications, provided
that such communications are made in the ordinary course of business
103. 17 C.F.R. § 230.163A (2006).
104. Id § 230.163A(a).
105. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,740.
106. 17 C.F.R. § 230.168(a).
107. Guidelines for Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in Regis-
tration, Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,506, 16,507 (Aug. 21, 1971);
Publication of Information Prior to or After Filing and Effective Date of Registration
Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33-5009, 34 Fed. Reg. 16,870, 16,870 (Oct. 18, 1969).
108. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591,70 Fed. Reg. at 44,736-37.
109. See id. at 44,736 n.127, 44,736-37.
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and are released for use by persons, such as customers or suppliers, who
are not using the information as potential investors." °
(f) Expanded Research Publications Permissible
In addition to the dramatic new rules described above, the SEC has
also revised Rules 137, 138, and 139, all of which relate to brokers and
dealers being allowed to continue to issue research reports on certain
issuing companies. The previous iterations of those rules were discussed
above to illustrate the historical position that the dissemination to the
market of research on issuing companies has been encouraged. This has
been consistent with simultaneous attempts to curb the conditioning of
the market by participants in the offering who stood to gain financially
from inflating the price of the securities to be offered. However, efforts
were made to keep those exceptions narrow with the purpose of avoiding
any market hype by analysts who might have a financial interest in an
upcoming offering.1"' The reforms expand the exceptions, providing op-
portunities for financially interested parties to publish research on up-
coming securities offerings with fewer restrictions.
(i) Revised Rule 137 Now Applies to All Issuers, Not Just Report-
ers
As was described above, Rule 137 has been available as a safe harbor
for brokers and dealers who issue reports in the ordinary course of their
business, and who have no financial interest in the proposed offering, and
who are not specially compensated for their reports. The rule was re-
stricted to reports issued about companies that were already reporting
companies under the Exchange Act.13 The theory was that such compa-
nies had brokers and dealers already following them and issuing regular
research reports. Thus, such ordinary course of business reports were to
be encouraged and not inhibited despite the pending new offering. Re-
vised Rule 137 keeps much of the old rule but expands the scope of the
rule so that now the company that is the subject of the publication is not
required to be a reporting company under the Exchange Act. This un-
dercuts the idea that the company should have been the subject of regular
reporting prior to the proposed offering, changing the nature of this rule
to allow for promotions of new issuers with new offerings.
110. 17 C.F.R. § 230.169 (2006).
111. 17 C.F.R. § 230.137-.139 (2005).
112. Id. § 230.137.
113. Id.
114. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,762.
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(ii) Revised Rule 138 Now Applies to All Reporting Companies
Like Rule 137, Rule 138 was designed to allow brokers and dealers to
continue to publish research on a company, even though the company
was planning an upcoming new offering of securities.' Under Rule 138,
however, the broker or dealer could participate in the upcoming offering
and still publish research reports on the issuing company's securities, as
long as those securities were of a different type than the type being of-
fered."6 So, brokers and dealers could continue to report on fixed in-
come-type securities if they were participating in an offering of common
stock. Likewise, Rule 138 allowed brokers and dealers to publish re-
search on common stock of an issuer even if they were participating in an
offering of that issuer's fixed income-type security."7 Rule 138 had been
restricted to situations where the issuing company was eligible to file its
registration statement with the SEC on Form S-3 or Form F-3 . This
meant that the rule only applied to companies that had a certain magni-
tude and following in the market. That restriction is abolished in the re-
vised rule. Under revised Rule 138, the company that is the subject of the
report now need only be a reporting company under the Exchange Act or
a similar type of foreign company. 9 Just as the recent reforms expand
the availability of the Rule 137 safe harbor, so too the reforms greatly
expand the availability of the Rule 138 safe harbor.
(iii) Revised Rule 139: No Need to Report Regularly or Restrain
Upgrades
Rule 139 has changed dramatically as a result of the revisions. Previous
Rule 139 allowed brokers and dealers who were participants in an up-
coming offering to publish research reports on the issuer's securities, pro-
vided that they did so regularly in the ordinary course of its business and
either: (i) the issuing company was of a certain size and stature; or (ii) the
publication also reported on other similar types of companies, gave no
special prominence to the issuer, and did not upgrade any previous rec-
ommendations.'2' Revised Rule 139 continues to have two alternative
bases for the safe harbor but both expand the broker's or dealer's ability
to qualify for the safe harbor, allowing brokers and dealers who have
incentives to condition the market to do so with little restriction. 12'
115. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.138 (2005).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 230.138(a).
118. Id. § 230.138(b)-(c).
119. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.138 (2006); see also Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70
Fed. Reg. at 44,763.
120. 17 C.F.R. § 230.139 (2005).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 230.139 (2006).
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The first alternative in the revised Rule 139 safe harbor is that the is-
suer qualify as being of a certain size and stature. 22 Those requirements
are similar to the previous requirements. The significant change to this
part of the safe harbor is that the broker or dealer need not report regu-
larly on the issuer in the ordinary course of its business in order to pub-
lish a report covering an upcoming issuance in which it has a financial
stake.23 Once again, this revision undercuts the previous idea underscor-
ing these research publication rules- encouraging the continuation of
ordinary course of business research reports. The new requirement is
simply that the broker or dealer has published a report about the issuer at• • 124
least once previously. That new requirement could be met by a report
that is published two months prior to the proposed issuance, when a bro-
ker or dealer may indeed already have a vested stake in the issuance and,
in fact, is attempting to condition the market.
The second alternative in the revised Rule 139 has dramatically
changed the old rule. As described above, the old rule allowed for bro-
kers and dealers participating in an upcoming new offering to continue to
publish regular research about an issuer as long as they gave the issuer no
special prominence and did not upgrade their opinion about the issuer.'
1
Revised Rule 139 has eliminated that last safeguard. Accordingly, it
seems that a financially interested broker or dealer will be able to take
advantage of this revised safe harbor to inflate its rating of an upcoming
security despite having great financial incentive to condition the market
to increase the price of the securities being offered.
B. The Waiting Period
The waiting period kicks in once the issuer has filed its registration
statement regarding an upcoming new issuance of securities. During this
time, the gun-jumping restrictions imposed by section 5(c) of the Securi-
ties Act no longer apply.26 As a result, some communications have been
permitted during this period. Oral communications, for example, were
permitted to allow for a certain amount of selling to occur during the
waiting period. 27 However, section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act has re-
stricted any written communications during this period to a prospectus
authorized by section 10 of the Act.7'2
122. Id. § 230.139(a)(1).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 230.139(a)(1)(iii).
125. 17 C.F.R. § 230.139(b) (2005).
126. Section 5(c) applies "unless a registration statement has been filed as to such
security." Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2000).
127. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b).
128. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1).
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There were exceptions to the rule that a section 10 prospectus was the
only written communication allowed during the waiting period, including
exceptions for (i) so-called tombstone ads pursuant to section 2(a)(10) of
the Securities Act; 29 (ii) identifying statements issued pursuant to Rule
134;130 and (iii) broker or dealer reports pursuant to Rules 137, 138, and
139 discussed above. 3' Otherwise, all written communications were re-
quired to conform to prospectus requirements outlined in section 10 of
the Securities Act.3 2 All other writing, referred to as "free writing," was
strictly prohibited.'33 The recent reforms, however, have turned this re-
gime on its head, and now, in accordance with the reforms, free writing is
permitted during the waiting period. 34 This section will first describe in
some detail the regulatory regime regarding communications that used to
apply to the waiting period. It will then describe how, in a complete
turnabout of policy, the new reforms have essentially removed those
regulations.
(1) Historically, Free Writing Was Prohibited
Section 5(b)(1) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for anyone to
use a prospectus during the waiting period that does not meet the re-
quirements of section 10 of the Securities Act."' "Prospectus" is defined
in section 2(a)(10) of the Securities Act as broadly as possible to incorpo-
rate any communication relating to a security that is to be offered.' 36 The
result of these two sections is that the only written communication that
was generally allowed during the waiting period was a prospectus that
contained all the information required by section 10. That information
would always be contained in the registration statement filed with the
SEC, and thus the information was subject to SEC review and oversight.
This statutory restriction again reflects the SEC's historic concern that
issuers and others participating in an upcoming offering not be allowed to
communicate freely with the market for fear that unregulated communi-
cations might lead to more conditioning of the market and undue infla-
tion of the price of the upcoming offering. In a release discussing the
waiting period, the SEC stated clearly its position that "during this period
129. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10).
130. 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2006).
131. Id. § 230.137-.139.
132. Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j.
133. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1).
134. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722,44,744 (Aug. 3,2005).
135. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1).
136. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10).
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'free writing' is illegal.', 3 7 The SEC went on to explain that during the
waiting period, investors should be allowed "to become acquainted with
the information contained in the registration statement and to arrive at
an unhurried decision concerning the merits of the securities."' 3 Further,
the SEC reasoned that during this period, investors should have refer-
ence to the "preliminary prospectus in order to have a reliable source of
information.', 39 Clearly, the SEC was suspicious that any free writing
allowed during this period might not be reliable. With the passage of the
recent reforms, the SEC has reversed its position entirely on this matter.
The SEC promulgated Rules 430 and 431, which effectively relaxed the
requirement that a section 10 prospectus be the only communication al-
lowed during the waiting period.' ° These rules provide that a prelimi-
nary prospectus and a summary prospectus both meet the requirements
of section 10 of the Securities Act.'4' For that reason, either a preliminary
prospectus or a summary prospectus can be disseminated to the public
142during the waiting period. A preliminary prospectus, however, contains
all of the information required by a final prospectus, except that it can
omit the offering's final pricing information, which is typically only de-
termined immediately before the offering is finalized.'13 Rule 430 further
requires a form of the preliminary prospectus to be filed with the SEC as
a part of the registration statement.' 44 A summary prospectus must meet
all the requirements set forth by the summary prospectus rules for the
particular form an issuer uses to file its registration statement.' 45 In addi-
tion, the summary prospectus must be filed with the SEC in order to be
used.' 46 Because both of these documents essentially contain information
that would be in a final section 10 prospectus, their use does not unduly
condition the market during the waiting period.
Some other forms of communications beyond just a prospectus were
also allowed during the waiting period. These exceptions to the basic
rule were designed to allow the securities effectively to be sold by issuers.
The exceptions include: (i) tombstone ads in accordance with section
2(a)(10); (ii) expanded tombstone ads (also known as identifying state-
ments) in accordance with Rule 134; and (iii) oral selling efforts.
137. Offers and Sales of Securities by Underwriters and Dealers, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 33-4697, 29 Fed. Reg. 7317, 7317 (June 5, 1964).
138. Id. at 7317-18.
139. Id. at 7317.
140. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.430-.431 (2006).
141. Id.
142. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (2000).
143. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.430(a).
144. Id.
145. Id. § 230.431(b).
146. Id. § 230.431.
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(a) Tombstone Ads Allowed Limited Advertisements
Under the Securities Act, certain limited information was carved out of
the definition of a prospectus and could therefore be disseminated during
the waiting period without violating section 5(b)(1).147 That limited in-
formation was therefore permissible communication and became referred
to as a tombstone ad. The information allowed by this carve-out was
extremely limited and included a brief description of the security, the
price thereof, and an identification of who can execute orders.1' 8 The
tombstone ad also was required to state where a section 10 prospectus
could be obtained.1 49 The idea behind a tombstone ad was that some lim-
ited selling efforts were necessary during the waiting period in order for a
securities offering to be successful. This strictly limited factual communi-
cation was not likely to inflate the price of the security to be offered.
Further, the requirement that a tombstone ad make the public aware of
how to obtain a section 10 prospectus meant that investors reading a
tombstone ad at least had access to reliable information that was on file
with the SEC.
(b) Rule 134: Identifying Statements Allowed Additional Limited In-
formation
Section 2(a)(10) of the Securities Act goes beyond its carve-out for
tombstone ads to authorize the SEC to promulgate rules that allow for
more communication to be permitted during the waiting period. In
accordance with that authority, the SEC promulgated Rule 134.51 Rule
134 expanded the scope of information that can be released in an adver-
tisement or other publication during the waiting period.5 2 Nonetheless,
Rule 134 carefully itemized what information can be disclosed. Infor-
mation disclosed pursuant to this rule is sometimes referred to as an iden-
tifying statement. Rule 134 limited information that could be contained
in such a statement to the information allowed by a tombstone ad plus
other basic factual information about the offering including: (i) basic in-
formation about the issuer's business;"s (ii) the price of the security;'55
(iii) the yield, if the security is debt;' 56 (iv) the name of the sender of the
147. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000).
148. See id.
149. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10).
150. Id.
151. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2005).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3).
155. Id. § 230.134(a)(4).
156. Id. § 230.134(a)(5).
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communication;57 (v) information regarding whether the security is legal
for certain types of investors to purchase;'58 and (vi) other similar factual
information that briefly describes the nature of the security being of-
fered.9 This expanded ability for issuers to communicate to the public
was helpful to issuers in their attempt to sell a new offering of securities
but was also sufficiently factual so as not to present an undue risk of mis-
leading the market or inflating the price for the securities to be offered.
(c) Oral Selling Efforts Were Allowed, Including Road Shows
Finally, the Securities Act acknowledged that once a registration
statement has been filed, the issuer, its underwriters, and the brokers and
dealers participating in the offering should be allowed to communicate
orally with potential investors to generate enough interest to sell the se-
curities being offered.' 6 Accordingly, oral offers and selling efforts were
carved out from the prohibitions on communications during the waiting
period. Eventually, issuers and underwriters began to use this oral ex-
emption to conduct meetings with groups of potential investors. These
meetings became known as road shows because they were organized
across the country, and issuers and underwriters would travel from one
city to the next to give their oral presentations to groups of brokers, deal-
ers, and typically sophisticated, well-connected investors."' Although
these oral presentations may have also used slide shows, all the material
that was a part of the road show was, and still is, deemed to be part of an
oral communication162
Road shows became increasingly controversial in the 1990s with the
advent of Internet companies that created taped versions of road shows
available for dissemination to wider audiences. 63 On the one hand, the
157. Id. § 230.134(a)(6).
158. Id. § 230.134(a)(9).
159. See, e.g., id. § 230.134(a)(7)-(8), (10)-(13).
160. Section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act, which regulates communications during the
waiting period, specifically does not restrict oral communications during this period. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (2000). By comparison, Section 5(c)
clearly restricts oral communications during the pre-filing period. See Securities Act of
1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
161. Cf. Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers, Transfer Agents, and Investment
Advisers for Delivery of Information, Securities Act Release No. 33-7288, 61 Fed. Reg.
24,644, 24,644, 24,650 (May 15, 1996).
162. However, these written or recorded presentation "aides" may not be disseminated
to potential investors. See Exploration, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67374, at *1
(Nov. 11, 1986).
163. See, e.g., Charles Schwab & Co. SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 146586 (Feb. 9,
2000); Charles Schwab & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 903, at *1
(Nov. 15, 1999); Activate.net Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 766
(Sept. 21, 1999); Thomson Fin. Servs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 837 (Sept. 4, 1998); Bloomberg L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act.
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road show had historically been a permissible type of sales effort during
the waiting period. On the other hand, it seems that the road show was
permissible because it was typically being communicated only to sophisti-
cated investors, brokers, and dealers, who would not normally need the
protection of the SEC in making their investment decisions.64
The recent reforms undertaken by the SEC were designed, in part, to
resolve this controversy, and they did.165 As the next sections will detail,
recorded road shows are now simply considered free writing and are
permitted to be published to any investor, regardless of whether those
investors are sophisticated or not, and regardless of whether those inves-
tors might benefit from SEC protection) 66
(2) The Reforms Allow Free Communications During the Waiting Pe-
riod
Despite the Security Act's design to prohibit free communications dur-
ing the waiting period, the SEC has now crafted a series of new and re-
vised rules, so that essentially almost all participants in a securities offer-
ing can communicate freely with the public. This is an incredible turn
around from both the language of the Securities Act itself and the SEC's
historical position. This section will describe in detail the rules and revi-
sions that the SEC has enacted in its recent reforms that make free com-
munications during the waiting period possible. More specifically, this
section will discuss: (i) the revisions that the SEC has made to rule 134,
providing for expanded identifying statements;167 (ii) the broad permissi-
bility of using free writings during the waiting period under new Rule 164
and revised Rule 433;'68 and (iii) the SEC's new position that road shows
169
can be disseminated widely to the public without restriction.
LEXIS 1023, at *1-5 (Dec. 1, 1997); Net Roadshow, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter [1997
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 77,367, at 77,849-51 (Sept. 8, 1997); Private
Fin. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,332, at 77,674-78 (Mar. 12, 1997).
164. Note that the securities regulations have typically exempted from regulation secu-
rities that are offered to sophisticated investors. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006) (al-
lowing for securities with an unlimited dollar value to be sold without registration at all so
long as they are only sold to sophisticated investors or investors represented by sophisti-
cated advisors).
165. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,753-54 (Aug. 3, 2005).
166. 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(d)(8).
167. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591,70 Fed. Reg. at 44,742-44.
168. Id. at 44,746-49.
169. Id. at 44,753-55.
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(a) Revised Rule 134 Provides for Additional Disclosures
As discussed above, Rule 134 was made available to issuers under sec-
tion 2(a)(10) of the Securities Act, which provides the definition of "pro-
spectus."' 70 Rule 134 created an exception within the definition of a pro-
spectus for an identifying statement about an upcoming securities offer-
ing that contained only limited information.17' Again, the theory was that
the factual information allowed in an identifying statement was essential
for an issuer to be able to market its securities during the waiting period
but did not create significant risk that the market would be conditioned
to overprice the securities being offered. Revised Rule 134 amplifies the
gambit of information that may now be included in an identifying state-
ment. The SEC has stated that this revision is designed to help the is-
suer market its securities but still ensure that the information disclosed
does not create the potential for offering abuses.173
The additional information allowed under revised Rule 134 includes:
(i) information on how to contact the issuer; 74 (ii) the price of the secu-
rity; 75 (iii) information about how to contact the sender of the informa-
tion;176 (iv) information about who will be the underwriters; 77 and (vi)
other limited factual information about the offering.7 7 From the very
description of the newly authorized information, it is clear that this new
information is designed to allow the investor to more easily contact the
issuer, the party who disseminated the information, or any of the under-
writers involved in the offering. From there, those offering participants
can continue their selling effort with more ease.
(b) New Rules 164 and 433 Allow Free Writing
Much more startling than the expanded information permitted to be
disclosed under Rule 134 is the outright permission provided by the new
reforms for the publication of a free writing during the waiting period.'79
Rule 164 introduces a new concept-a "free writing prospectus" - and
states that such information will be deemed a section 10 prospectus under
the Securities Act and therefore is allowed to be published during the
waiting period under section 5(b)(1) of the Act.' ° "Free writing prospec-
170. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000).
171. 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2005).
172. 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2006).
173. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,742.
174. 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(1) (2006).
175. Id. § 230.134(a)(4).
176. Id. § 230.134(a)(8).
177. Id. § 230.134(a)(10).
178. See id. § 230.134.
179. See id. §§ 230.164, 230.433.
180. Id. § 230.164.
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tus" is then defined in revised Rule 405 to be any written communication
pertaining to a securities offering made after a registration statement is
filed with respect to that offering.181 These sections together mean that
any written communication regarding an offering is allowed to be pub-
licly disseminated during the waiting period.
There are some restrictions, however. Rule 164 states that the use of a
free writing prospectus is subject to the requirements set forth in new
Rule 433.1'2 And so the plot thickens. Rule 433 enumerates many com-
plex requirements for use of the free writing prospectus, but none of
those rules represent significant limitations on offering participants freely
communicating with the public during the waiting period.
1 3
Rule 433 requires that a registration statement be on file to use a free
writing prospectus. 184 In the case of unseasoned and non-reporting issu-
ers, there must be a registration statement on file that specifies the price
range at which its offering will be conducted, and the free writing pro-
spectus must be accompanied or preceded by such registration state-
ment.'85 Note well that WKSIs are not constrained by this requirement
and, as was discussed earlier, in 2004, WKSIs "accounted for about 95%
of U.S. equity market capitalization."' 18 Even for the unseasoned and
non-reporting issuers who are constrained by this requirement, such issu-
ers are still able to communicate anything they wish to the public; they
simply must follow the rules.
Rule 433 describes the information that can be included in the free
writing prospectus as, essentially, anything that does not conflict with
information in an issuer's registration statement or periodic reports filed
under the Exchange Act. 87 Again, this condition does not represent a
significant limitation on communications to the public during the waiting
period.
Rule 433 requires that the free writing prospectus be filed with the SEC
at the time of its use in certain circumstances.9' An issuer must file the
communication with the SEC if any of the following apply: (i) the issuer
uses the communication; (ii) the communication is used by another offer-
ing participant but contains information about the issuer not in the regis-
tration statement; or (iii) the communication contains the final terms of
181. Id. § 230.405.
182. Id. § 230.164.
183. See id. § 230.433.
184. Id. § 230.433(b).
185. Id. § 230.433(b)(2).
186. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,727 (Aug. 3, 2005).
187. 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(c).
188. Id. § 230.433(d).
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the securities in the offering.t89 Any offering participant other than the
issuer that uses a free writing prospectus must file that prospectus if it is
disseminated to a broad, unrestricted audience.' 9 These filing conditions
do not seem to limit the ability for any offering participant to communi-
cate freely with the public concerning an upcoming offering.
(c) New Rule 433: Road Shows Can Be Freely Presented to the Public
In stark contrast to the treatment of road shows prior to the new re-
forms, a road show is now either: (i) freely permitted as oral communica-
tion if it originates as a live presentation before an interactive audience,
or (ii) freely permitted as a free writing prospectus if it is recorded. 91 In
either case, road shows are no longer restricted to small audiences made
up mostly of brokers, dealers, and sophisticated investors.
In its reforms, the SEC specifically focused on clarifying the treatment
of road shows and their electronic transmission over the Internet or cable
television stations.92 As applied to road shows, the new rule is relatively
simple. If a road show originates before a live audience, even if it is
broadcast to a large audience, it will be considered oral, and therefore,
permitted under section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act.1 93 This means that
a road show originally given in front of a live audience could be rebroad-
cast and would still be considered oral and permissible. On the other
hand, a road show that does not originate as a live presentation to an
interactive audience but is recorded and then broadcast will be consid-
ered a free writing prospectus.' 94 In accordance with the free writing pro-
spectus rules, such communication is also freely permitted, though the
free writing prospectus requirements must be satisfied. There is a special
exemption from filing, however, for a road show that is a free writing
prospectus.'95 Such communications typically need not be filed with the
SEC. 196
In accordance with the categorization of the road show itself, any
documents, slides, or other materials used in connection with that road
show will be included in that same category.'9 Therefore, if a road show
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 230.433(d)(8).
192. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,753-54 (Aug. 3, 2005).
193. Id. at 44,753.
194. 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(d)(8) (2006).
195. Id.
196. There is an exception for issuers that are not required to file reports under the
Exchange Act. Such issuers must file a copy of the road show unless such show is readily
available to any investor. See id.
197. Id.
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is live and is considered to be oral and permitted, then the supporting
written materials that are used are also considered to be oral (provided
they are not distributed to the audience).9 Likewise, if the road show is
recorded and is therefore deemed to be a free writing prospectus, then
the supporting written materials will be deemed to be part of that free
writing prospectus.' 99
Again, this new SEC policy of allowing broad dissemination of road
shows is contrary to the SEC's historical treatment of road shows as being
allowed but restricted. Now, road shows can reach an undifferentiated
broad public audience, can contain any promotional materials, and are
freely permissible.
C. The Post-Effective Period
The final phase of a securities offering is the post-effective period. This
period occurs after the SEC has declared an issuer's registration state-
ment effective. Unlike in previous periods, in this period, an issuer and
its participating parties can actually confirm their sales of securities.
However, in accordance with the Securities Act, a confirmation of sale
could not be delivered unless and until the purchaser had received a final
201Oneaiprospectus. Once again, the recent reforms have completely changed
the previous requirements. Under the new reforms, a final prospectus
need only be on file with the SEC for a sales confirmation to be made.
202
This section will describe more specifically the restrictions on communi-
cations that existed in the post-effective period prior to the recent re-
forms enacted by the SEC and will then describe the changes wrought by
those reforms.
(1) Historically, Investors Had to Receive a Final Prospectus Prior to
Sale
Section 5(a) of the Securities Act makes it illegal to sell securities until
a registration statement has been declared effective by the SEC. 2 3 In the
post-effective period, that is exactly what has happened-a registration
statement has been declared effective-and thus, sales of the securities
being offered are finally permitted. Section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act,
however, makes it illegal to transmit those securities being sold to the
investor if the transmission is not accompanied or preceded by the final
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2000).
201. Id.
202. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,783 (Aug. 3, 2005).
203. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a).
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prospectus described by section 10(a) of the Securities Act. 04 Further,
this Article described earlier that section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act
prohibits sending any prospectus to investors concerning a registered
offering.2 5 "Prospectus" is defined broadly in section 2(a)(10) as any
communication regarding the offering.' °6 But this definition specifically
excludes any communication regarding an offering that is made to an
investor after a section 10(a) final prospectus has been delivered to that
investor' 7 Thus, the prohibition against sending any prospectus to inves-
tors concerning an offering-set forth in section 5(b)(1) of the Securities
Act-is of no significance where a final prospectus has already been de-
livered to the investor. Although this is a complex regulatory regime, the
result is that once a registration statement has been declared effective,
investors must be given a final prospectus in order to either have their
sale confirmed or to receive any other communications regarding the
offering.
In the preceding discussion about the waiting period, it was noted that
the SEC considered that period the time during which an investor should
be able to come to a reasonable and "unhurried decision" with respect to
whether to purchase a new security being offered.06 In the post-effective
period, the regulatory regime mandated that all investors receive the final
prospectus to ensure that investors would have all the required, balanced,
and reliable information that they needed in order to finalize their in-
vestment decision.m9
(2) The Reforms Provide that Access to a Prospectus Equals Delivery
Once again, the recent SEC reforms are in stark contrast to the regime
set up by the Securities Act. The reforms provide that an issuer or any
participant in an offering need not make sure that an investor has re-
ceived a final prospectus before finalizing its decision to invest in the new
offering.2 0 Rule 172 is simple and reverses the old regulatory regime.
Rule 172 provides that as long as a registration statement is on file with
the SEC and has been declared effective, there is no need for delivery of
a final prospectus as required by section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act."'
Likewise, the prohibition on communications contained in section 5(b)(1)
is no longer effective with respect to communications confirming a sale,
204. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2).
205. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b).
206. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10).
207. Id.
208. Offers and Sales of Securities by Underwriters and Dealers, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 33-4697, 29 Fed. Reg. 7317, 7317-18 (June 5, 1964).
209. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b).
210. 17 C.F.R. § 230.172 (2006).
211. Id.
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including a broad definition of the types of communication that might
212
accompany such communication.
The SEC describes this new regime as "access equals delivery. '213 The
theory is that as long as investors have access to the information, it is not
required to be delivered. Further, this idea is buttressed by the concept
that access to the information is made easy through the SEC's online fil-
ing system, EDGAR.'14 Nonetheless, with Rule 172, the requirement
designed by the Securities Act that investors actually have received the
final prospectus, including all of its required and reliable information, is
215
now gone.
This particular reform seems to be a particularly glaring example of
how the SEC's recent reforms appear to turn away from the notion that
the SEC should proactively protect the interests of all investors. As this
reform item suggests, the SEC now seems to expect or presume that in-
vestors are sophisticated enough to conduct their own legal research on
the Internet to find the relevant information that previously would have
been delivered to them. It is also quite striking that the SEC bases its
reform on the presumption that all investors have access to the Internet,
and moreover, that they know how to effectively research information on
the Internet. As easily as the SEC presumes that investors are savvy
enough to use the Internet and find legal documents, it is far easier to
imagine investors who neither have the Internet nor have ever heard of
the SEC's website. To shift the basic presumption that investors should
be given the appropriate information by issuers, to a presumption that
the investors should be forced to find that information for themselves, is
truly remarkable-and, in fact, telling-for an agency whose mandate is
the protection of the investor.
I1. NEW OFFERING PROCEDURES MEAN LESS OVERSIGHT
Among the most dramatic features of the new securities reform is the
introduction of the automatic shelf registration for WKSIs.116 Shelf regis-
trations have been specifically allowed in the United States under Rule
415 of the Securities Act since the early 1980s.2 7 However, the new
212. See id.
213. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,783 (Aug. 3, 2005).
214. EDGAR is the name of the SEC's database of company filings. It stands for the
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system. See U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Important Information About Edgar, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last vis-
ited Jan. 29, 2007).
215. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.172.
216. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591,70 Fed. Reg. at 44,777.
217. See Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,890,
52,892 & n.19 (Nov. 23, 1983).
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automatic shelf registration provides new freedom to WKSIs to register a
base prospectus that will be automatically effective without SEC ap-
proval and then offer any securities they want, at any time.
A. Historically, Shelf Registration Was Limited Under Rule 415
Shelf registrations allowed many issuers to file a registration statement
that would cover any securities that such issuer wanted to sell in the sub-
sequent two years. The shelf registration statement would contain basic
information about the issuer and the securities it was "placing on the
21shelf" to sell over the subsequent two years. 18 As with any registration
statement, the basic shelf registration statement needed to be reviewed
and declared effective by the SEC.2 9 Then, when the issuer was ready to
actually sell some or all of those shelf securities, the registration state-
ment would need to be updated with the specific details of the offering.m
In order to qualify to use a shelf registration, the securities being issued
had to meet one of the categories enumerated in the rule. Most of those
categories involved securities that would naturally be offered on a de-
layed or continuous basis, such as securities offered in a dividend rein-
vestment plan or securities issued upon the exercise of outstanding war-
rants or options.22' Shelf registration covering these securities was neces-
sary to allow such securities to be issued over time. However, Rule 415
also allowed any securities that could be registered on Form S-3 or Form
F-3 to be included in a shelf registration. 2M That meant that the issuers
qualified to use such forms (typically well-established and well-followed
companies) could take advantage of shelf registrations for their basic
equity and debt securities.
Prior to the recent reforms, the initial filing of a shelf registration
needed to specify basic information about the issuer and also needed to
specify the type and value of the securities to be sold in the period cov-
ered by the shelf registration.m Registration fees for securities being so
"registered to the shelf" needed to be paid for when the shelf was regis-
tered.22 Finally, any offerings of equity securities that were to be "at the
market" price had to be restricted to essentially 10% of the value of the
then-outstanding voting securities and was subject to other restrictions.m'
Overall, the shelf registration rules provided for desired flexibility
where securities needed to be offered on a delayed or continuous basis,
218. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2005).
219. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2000).
220. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(3).
221. Id. § 230.415(a)(1)(ii), (iii).
222. Id. § 230.415(a)(1)(x).
223. See id. § 230.415.
224. See id.
225. Id. § 230.415(a)(4).
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while also allowing well-known issuers additional flexibility to sell other
securities on this delayed basis. This has been particularly valuable for
debt securities because issuers are able to issue debt securities that are
subject to a shelf registration with very short notice. This has allowed
issuers to take advantage of "market windows" when interest rates are
favorable to the issuer.26
Still, the restrictions on the shelf registration procedures meant that
shelf registrations would be the exception to general registration proce-
dures, not the rule. It is interesting to note that when the SEC published
its original release concerning Rule 415, then-SEC Commissioner Tho-
mas expressed strong concerns about shelf registration procedures "re-
duce[ing] the quality and timeliness of disclosure available to inves-
tors. ' m She went on to state that "[i]ncurring these risks is antithetical to
the statutory duty of the Commission to protect investors and to maintain
the integrity of our capital markets."
B. Revised Rule 415 Allows Unrestricted Sales of Securities for WKSIs
Under the revised rules, WKSIs are now allowed to file automatic shelf
registration statements.2 This new mechanism, coupled with the new
communication rules described above, provides WKSIs with an incredi-
ble amount of freedom to sell securities whenever they wish and with
whatever promotional materials they wish.
These registration statements are called automatic because they will be
automatically effective upon filing; therefore, issuers do not need to await
SEC approval to begin selling securities immediately~23 Other restric-
tions that applied to Rule 415 have also been removed. The value of se-
curities being offered need not be discussed.23' Accordingly, it is impossi-
ble to pay registration fees on securities put on this shelf. Instead, issuers
will pay registration fees "as they go. 2 32 In other words, an issuer will
pay registration fees as it actually sells securities. The new Rule 415 al-
lows for even more information to be excluded from the initial shelf reg-
istration statement, so long as it is included in the prospectus supplement
226. See Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,890,
52,891 (Nov. 23, 1983).
227. Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, Securities Act Release
No. 33-6423,47 Fed. Reg. 39,799,39,803 (Sept. 10, 1982) (Thomas, Comm'r, dissenting).
228. Id.
229. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2006).
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,777 (Aug. 3, 2005) (describing the "pay-as-you-go" approach).
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that precedes an actual offering. 3 Finally, an automatic shelf registration
is valid for three years, at which time an issuer can simply file a new
automatic shelf to cover the next three years.234
When the new automatic shelf registration is coupled with the ability
for WKSIs to use a free writing prospectus, the resulting regime is one in
which a WKSI that takes advantage of an automatic shelf can offer secu-
rities essentially whenever it wants to, and can communicate to the mar-
ket freely about the offering. Once the shelf is in place, a WKSI is only
constrained in making an offering by having to file updates to the base
prospectus that is already on file with the SEC. It must do this to update
any information in the base prospectus that might be misleading at the
time the offering is contemplated, and it must also file information spe-
cific to the securities that it intends to sell. But the issuer need not wait
for SEC authorization before going ahead with the offering. Further, in
accordance with the communications reforms discussed above, a WKSI
can use free writing prospectuses at any time, although such communica-
tions may also need to be filed.23 The automatic shelf registration and
the ability to use free writing prospectuses effectively eliminate any true
restrictions on a WKSI's access to the public capital markets. As long as
a WKSI follows the filing rules, it can sell securities freely to the public,
as well as being able to communicate about them freely. 6 This result is
remarkable: it effectively reverses the regulatory regime set up by the
Securities Act-at least with respect to WKSIs.
IV. NEW COMMUNICATIONS WITHOUT SECTION 11 STRICT LIABILITY
As the new communications rules show, there will now be much more
communication between issuers and other participants in an upcoming
securities offering, and the public. Ironically, these newly permitted
communications also have a lower standard for liability that attaches to
any false or misleading statements than had been the case for pre-
offering communications prior to the reforms. This section will discuss
the heightened liability that existed for most communications that were
used to sell securities in the pre-reform world. It will then discuss how
that heightened liability was dismantled by the reforms.
233. In addition to information that could have been excluded under Rule 415 previ-
ously, issuers can now exclude: (i) whether the offering is primary or secondary;
(ii) description of the securities beyond name or class; (iii) names of any selling security
holders; and (iv) any plan of distribution. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415.
234. Id. § 230.415(a)(5).
235. See Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,777.
236. See id.
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A. Section 11 Created Heightened Liability for Registration Statements
As has been discussed, historically, communications during a securities
offering were greatly restricted in order to prevent conditioning of the
market and inflating the value of the securities that were to be sold. Al-
most no communication with the public was allowed during the pre-filing
237period. During the waiting period, the only communication allowed to
be disseminated to the public was a prospectus, the brief factual informa-
tion contained in tombstone ads, or identifying statements. 38 Section 5 of
the Securities Act ensured that communications were thus limited. But
the Securities Act went on in its effort to ensure that only high quality
information reached the public about public securities offerings by in-
cluding section 11.239
Section 11 created a special heightened liability for registration state-
ments that are false or misleading at the time they become effective.
24°
Section 11 instructs that any of the parties who in any way participated in
creating the registration statement could be found jointly and severally
liable under its provisions.241 The preliminary prospectus, which was the
main written sales document used by offerors and other offering partici-
pants during the waiting period, is a part of the registration statement that
is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission so that it can be de-
clared effective. Once the registration statement is declared effective the
entire document is subject to Section 11 liability, including the prospectus. 242
By making all of the authors of the registration statement jointly and sev-
erally liable for any misstatements, the Securities Act created incentives
for all of such authors to ensure that the registration statement (and,
therefore, the prospectus) contain high-quality information that was not
likely to mislead the public.
243
Section 11 provides for a heightened standard of liability for any false
or misleading statements or omissions in a registration statement because
the plaintiff who purchased the security need not prove some of the tradi-
tional elements required to state a claim for fraud.2" In a section 11 ac-
tion, the plaintiff must allege merely that the registration statement con-
tained a false or misleading statement (or omitted a statement necessary
to make other statements not misleading) and that the plaintiff acquired
237. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2000).
238. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1).
239. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (discussing civil liabilities for false
registration statements).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.501-.512 (2005).
243. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f).
244. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000), and
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006), with Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
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securities that were subject to such registration statement.2 45 The tradi-
tional fraud elements of reliance and causation are not required . Fur-
ther, when the issuer is the defendant, the plaintiff need not even prove
that the issuer knew of the misstatement or omission, as long as there was
247such a statement (or, again, omission) in the registration statement.
Lack of knowledge of the misstatement is a defense for all participants in
an offering, except for the issuer.2
The Securities Act was so concerned about the quality of information
disseminated to the public in a registered offering that the liability associ-
ated with that information was heightened. This heightened standard
was designed to deter anyone participating in preparing the registration
statement from the temptation to mislead the market in order to inflate
the value of the securities to be sold . 9 Section 11 specifically names the
categories of people who might be liable under its provision. 25 Those
people include anyone who signs the registration statement (including the
issuer itself), any director of the issuer, and any underwriter.2 1 In addi-
tion, any expert (such as accountants, engineers, or attorneys) whose
statements are contained in a registration statement will be liable under
section 11 for its own statements.z2 The joint and several liability that
attaches to each of these offering participants provides them with a great
incentive to ensure that the registration statement is not misleading. The
practical result of this has been that when a registration statement is pre-
pared, representatives from all of these parties are on hand to approve
the final language. Each of the participants in the preparation of the
document thus became a "gatekeeper" of the information that would be
disseminated to the public.23 Each gatekeeper was therefore motivated
by fear of section 11 liability to ensure the registration statement was free
from anything misleading.
As mentioned above, section 11 requires a certain degree of knowledge
of the misrepresentation to establish culpability for a defendant other
than the issuer. This element is embedded in section l's "due diligence"
defense. 4 Section 11 establishes a due diligence defense for parties
245. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. 77k(a).
246. See id.
247. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)-(b).
248. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b).
249. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,381-82 (1983).
250. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
251. See Securities Act of 1933 § ll(a)(1)-(2), (5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(2), (5).
252. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4).
253. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1296-97 (2003).
254. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing and detailing the due diligence
defense as it may apply to the various possible defendants in a Section 11 suit).
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(other than the issuer) who might otherwise be liable under section 11 if
they can show, "after reasonable investigation," that they did not know of
the false or misleading statement in the registration statement. 5  This
"due diligence" defense is not available for issuers who remain strictly
liable for any false or misleading statements in the registration state-
ment.
56
B. The Reforms Allow Free Writing Without Heightened Liability
As a result of the reforms, virtually any offering participant can pre-
pare and use their own free writing prospectus during the waiting period
in an attempt to sell the securities subject to the offering. As discussed
earlier, participants in an offering by a WKSI are allowed to use free writ-
ing prospectuses throughout the offering process (including during the
pre-filing period) . 7 These free writing prospectuses are, by design of the
reforms, not subject to the heightened anti-fraud provisions of section
11. This means that much of the information disseminated to the public
during the selling phases of an offering will simply not be subject to the
discipline that has been applied historically to writing a registration
statement (and the prospectus contained therein).
In its offering release, the SEC explains that liability still exists for any
misleading statement contained in these documents in accordance with
section 12 of the Securities Act and sections 10b and 17 of the Exchange
Act. None of these anti-fraud provisions, however, are as strict as section
11, and each is much more difficult for potential plaintiffs to use. 2
9
Section 12 of the Securities Act is the anti-fraud section that is most
likely to be applied to free writing prospectuses.i It is simply not as
strict as section 11 in combating fraud. Section 12(a)(2) makes any per-
son who sells a security by means of a false or misleading prospectus li-
261
able to the purchaser. It should already be apparent that this section is
not as effective as section 11 because there is no joint and several liability
for all of the authors of the misleading communication. Liability under
262
section 12 attaches only to the party who sold the security. In addition,
as under section 11, section 12 allows for a due diligence defense for de-
255. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b).
256. See id.
257. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722,44,744 (Aug. 3,2005).
258. See id. at 44,759.
259. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006), and Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. §
771(a), and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, with Securities Act of
1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
260. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771.
261. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
262. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a).
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fendants. However, under section 12, an issuer is able to use the due dili-
gence defense, in contrast to section 11. Further, the due diligence de-
fense is much easier to satisfy than the standard set forth in section 11.
Under section 12, a defendant need only prove that such person did not
know of the false or misleading statement or omission and "in the exer-
cise of reasonable care" could not have known.'6' This standard is much
easier to satisfy than section l's standard, which provides that a party
must not have known "after a reasonable investigation. ''2,4
In sum, the new reform allows for more communications than were
previously allowed, but the communications that are permitted are not
subject to the same high standard of anti-fraud liability as statements that
were previously allowed. It is only logical, therefore, that the quality of
the information being disseminated to the markets will suffer. Once
again, it seems the SEC has erred on the side of accommodating issuers
and other market participants at the expense of investors.
V. HAS THE SEC EXCEEDED ITS RULEMAKING AUTHORITY?
In the previous sections, this Article has pointed out how the reforms
enacted by the SEC seem to completely rewrite the regulatory regime
designed by Congress in section 5 of the Securities Act. This section of
the Article will discuss, as an administrative law matter, whether the SEC
has the authority to so dramatically override an act of Congress, even if
the act is over seventy years old.
A. Agencies Are Authorized to Act Narrowly on Administrative Matters
Legislative authority is the province of the United States Congress.
The source for this basic presumption is nothing less than the United
States Constitution.2 Nonetheless, Congress can, and does, delegate
some of its legislative power to administrative agencies.26 The agencies
enact rules, which then have the power of law, provided that they are
enacted in accordance with the specific delegation of power given to
them by Congress.267 This delegation of authority is generally accepted
and has been greeted with approval by the courts for many years.6
There are a variety of reasons that justify the ability of Congress to dele-
gate rulemaking authority to administrative agencies. Chief among these
reasons is that an administrative agency can harness expertise to develop
263. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
264. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b).
265. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States .... ).
266. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989).
267. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,226-27 (2001).
268. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381,401-03 (1940).
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specific and detailed regulations necessary to carry out a legislative act of
Congress that would take enormous amounts of time for Congress todevelop.269
(1) Delegations of Authority Are Limited to Discrete Matters
Delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies, however,
are not without their limits. While technical, detailed matters have been
deemed appropriate for administrative agencies, larger questions that
have important social impact have not been deemed appropriate for
270delegation to administrative agencies. Scholars frequently cite the very
nature of the United States government to justify this maxim 7' The no-
tion is that the United States government was meant to be a system
whereby elected officials debate issues of social importance to arrive at
decisions by consensus. To abdicate this process on important questions
of policy is to undercut the Constitution and our very system of govern-
ment. Moreover, scholars have frequently commented on the fact that
administrative agencies by their very nature may "unduly favor organized
interests, especially the interests of regulated or client business firms and
other organized groups at the expense of diffuse, comparatively unorgan-
ized interests." 72 In the context of the SEC, this means that the SEC may
favor issuers and those organized interests that it was designed to regu-
late at the expense of the diffuse, unorganized interests of investors.
Such a potential systematic bias makes delegation to the SEC of large
questions that have grave social implications potentially inappropriate,
and could lead to results that are contrary to those presupposed in a rep-
resentative democracy.
At various times, Congress has attempted to delegate broad issues of
social concern to administrative agencies. In a few of those circum-
stances, the act of Congress authorizing such delegation was declared
unconstitutional. 3 In the 1930s, the Supreme Court acted in two cases to
274nullify a congressional delegation of power to an administrative agency.In those cases, the Court discussed its view that Congress cannot abdicate
269. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 379 (discussing an administrative agency's unique
ability to handle detailed and technical matters better than Congress).
270. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) ("[T]he fundamental
policy decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official but by the body
immediately responsible to the people.").
271. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
272. Id. at 1684.
273. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,433 (1935).
274. See Schecter, 295 U.S. at 541-42; Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 421.
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its duties to establish national policy on fundamental issues. 5 Further,
Congress must delineate clear standards or procedures by which the ad-
276ministrative agency is to operate.
But the courts also have upheld broad congressional grants of power.
The landmark case in this regard is National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States,277 in which Congress delegated broad regulatory power to the Fed-
eral Communications Commission to regulate the broadcast industry in
accordance with the public interest.17' The Court recognized the broad
grant of authority but nevertheless upheld the delegation.279 This case has
been much criticized, including in a strong dissent by one of the Jus-
tices.28°
Despite National Broadcasting, the courts continue to review congres-
sional grants of authority that seem overly broad or vague.281 As recently
as 1995, the Eighth Circuit held that an open-ended delegation of author-
ity by Congress violated the Constitution.2  That court announced that a
delegation of authority must contain "an 'intelligible principle"' so that
the courts can measure an agency's behavior by the grant of authority
established by Congress.'
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court vacated the
1995 opinion, and it is therefore no longer binding 284 Additionally, the
Eighth Circuit revisited the issue in 2005 and came to quite the opposite
conclusion. 5 The court reasoned that when examining the broad circum-
stances surrounding the delegation, the delegation in question was not
286 21overly broad. The court relied on Mistretta v. United States for the
proposition that courts should give Congress wide latitude to delegate
authority to administrative agencies.2
275. See Schecter, 295 U.S. at 541-42; Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430.
276. See Schecter, 295 U.S. at 541; Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430.
277. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
278. Id. at 215-19.
279. Id. at 227.
280. Id. at 227-38 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the
IdealAdministration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1191 (1973).
281. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 337-42 (1974)
(construing the Independent Offices Appropriation Act narrowly to avoid unconstitutional
delegation).
282. South Dakota v. Dep't of Interior (South Dakota 1), 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995),
vacated, 519 U.S. 919 (1996).
283. Id. at 881-83 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409
(1928)).
284. South Dakota v. Dep't of Interior (South Dakota I1), 519 U.S. 919, 919-20 (1996).
285. South Dakota v. Dep't of Interior (South Dakota III), 423 F.3d 790, 795-99 (8th
Cir. 2005).
286. Id. at 799.
287. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
288. South Dakota III, 423 F.3d at 797.
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Moreover, in 2001, the Court upheld an extremely broad grant of au-
thority to an administrative agency in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns.2 9 In that case, the Court upheld the Clean Air Act's grant of au-
thority to the Environmental Protection Agency "to set air quality stan-
dards at the level that is 'requisite' . . . to protect the public health.
290
This case is now cited for the proposition that the modern Supreme Court
is unlikely to override a congressional grant of authority to an executive
agency, no matter how broad.291 Still, this particular case involved just the
kind of technical standard setting that is perfect for an executive agency.
It is hard to imagine Congress taking on the task of setting air quality
standards for a discrete set of pollutants based on the latest scientific
knowledge.
As the foregoing discussion shows, modem courts have typically de-
ferred to Congress in its delegation of broad authority to executive agen-
cies. Nonetheless, claims of unconstitutional delegation are still viable,
and federal courts are struggling to arrive at the appropriate rulings.
(2) Agencies Must Also Act Within Their Express Delegation of Power
In addition to the general maxim that important policy questions not be
left to administrative agencies, there is a second crucial limitation on
delegations of legislative authority by Congress. An administrative
agency is not allowed to exceed the express delegation of authority made
to it by Congress. 292 If the agency does, a court is empowered to nullify
the administrative action that exceeded the agency's authority. The
courts have exercised this ability frequently. 293 Still, it is important to
note that courts show special deference to administrative agencies' spe-
cial expertise to interpret and apply the statutes that govern them.294
B. In its Reforms, the SEC Has Recast Securities Regulation
In accordance with the general paradigm for agency authority, the SEC
was established by an act of Congress to oversee the implementation of
289. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,475-76 (2001).
290. Id. (citation omitted).
291. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine:
Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 239, 298
n.443 (2005) ("Whitman restates and reaffirms that almost any delegation meets the intel-
ligible principle standard.").
292. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984).
293. See, e.g., Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 754, 758-60 (D.C. Cit. 2003);
Cent. Forwarding, Inc. v. ICC, 698 F.2d 1266, 1284 (5th Cir. 1983).
294. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45.
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the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.295 Recently, Congress added
section 28 to the Securities Act to clarify the role of the SEC with respect
to that Act.29 6 Section 28 was enacted by Congress as part of the National
Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996.29  Section 28 expressly
grants broad authority to the SEC to oversee the Securities Act and
thereby regulate the U.S. securities market.298 In enacting its recent set of
reforms, the SEC is acting pursuant to authority it believes it has under
section 28. It is possible, however, that in accordance with the general
administrative law principals set forth in the preceding section: (i) section
28 is an overly broad, unconstitutional delegation of authority to an ad-
ministrative agency; or (ii) even if section 28 is not an unconstitutional
delegation of authority, the SEC has exceeded the express grant of au-
thority contained therein.
(1) Section 28 May Be an Unconstitutional Grant of Broad Authority to
the SEC
In the first instance, section 28 of the Securities Act may indeed be an
unconstitutional grant of authority to the SEC under the Constitution299
and previous case law. As discussed above, Congress may delegate some
of its legislative authority to administrative agencies but may not delegate
broad questions of important social concern. To do so defeats the very
foundation of our government, which requires that our elected officials
consider questions of fundamental importance and arrive at consensus
before new laws are enacted. Previous cases have nullified delegations to
an administrative agency on this basis.99 On the other hand, landmark
cases, including National Broadcasting and Whitman, saw the Supreme
Court uphold extremely broad grants of authority."1 Accordingly, it is
unclear how a court would rule if it were presented with the question of
whether section 28 is indeed an unconstitutional grant of authority.
Nonetheless, a strong argument exists in support of its unconstitutional-
ity.
Section 28 states that:
The Commission, by rule or regulation, may conditionally or
unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or
295. See Securities Exchange Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2000); see also U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, About the SEC, What We Do, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last
visited Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter About the SEC].
296. See Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3.
297. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, §
105, 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3).
298. See Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3.
299. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
300. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 277-79, 289-90 and accompanying text.
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from
any provision or provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or
regulation issued under this subchapter, to the extent that such
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and
is consistent with the protection of investors.3 °2
It is likely no coincidence that this express language includes the words
"in the public interest" just as the delegation of authority in National
Broadcasting. As discussed above, that language was declared constitu-
tional in National Broadcasting. Nonetheless, National Broadcasting was
widely criticized and there was a strong dissent.3 3 In accordance with the
theory of delegation discussed above, this delegation seems to be the
kind of broad-based delegation that the courts find inappropriate. In
fact, it would be difficult to draft a provision that would give the SEC
more power over the securities registration process. The express lan-
guage allows the SEC to undermine the Securities Act in any way it sees
fit (by exempting anyone or anything from its regulation), as long as such
action is done in the public interest and is consistent with the protection
of investors. The section gives no indication how a court might assess
what is in the public interest or the interest of investors.
Similar to the cases referenced above, where courts found the delega-
tion of legislative authority to be unconstitutional,30 the delegation of
legislative authority in section 28 is quite broad. In fact, in section 28, the
delegation seems to be as broad as possible, making this a more extreme
case than many of the cases involving broad delegations of authority.
Further, this delegation gives the courts no guidance for figuring out
when the SEC might actually exceed the authority granted to it. How
could a court assess whether exempting anyone or anything from regula-
tion of the securities laws would be in the public's interest, or, for that
matter, in the interest of investor protection? As the Eighth Circuit men-
tioned in Dole, there should be some intelligibility so that the courts can
figure out what the agency can and cannot do.3°5 Without any limits, an
agency would have too much legislative power and that would amount to
an unconstitutional reallocation of legislative authority.3°  As Justice
Cardozo stated, such a delegation would amount to "delegation running
riot.,,307
The philosophical underpinnings of the nondelegation doctrine buttress
the argument for why the SEC has exceeded its authority in its reforms.
302. Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3.
303. See supra note 280.
304. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542
(1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,433 (1935).
305. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
307. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 555 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
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The idea that issues with important social implications should be consid-
ered and debated by the elected officials in Congress and only resolved
through the considered action of those officials could not apply more
aptly than to securities law reform. The problem for the SEC, of course,
is that Congress may not have been able to muster the political clout to
pass such a sweeping reform package-especially at a time when the pub-
lic has become painfully aware of many recent market abuses by corpo-
rate actors.
(2) The SEC Also May Have Exceeded the Authority Given to it in Sec-
tion 28
Even if a court was unwilling to find the delegation of authority granted
in section 28 of the Securities Act to be unconstitutional, it is possible
that a court might find that the SEC exceeded its specific grant of author-
ity when it enacted its recent reforms. A court might find the SEC to
have exceeded its authority on the basis of two potentially restrictive
provisions contained in the grant of authority to the SEC.
(a) Authority to Create Exemptions Is Not Authority to Re-write the
Basic Rules
First, the grant of authority in section 28 states that the SEC can "ex-
empt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of per-
sons, securities, or transactions" from the scope of the Securities Act.3
As was described in great detail earlier, the SEC's reforms have gone
beyond merely exempting particular persons, securities, or transactions
or classes thereof from the provisions of the Securities Act. The reforms
have essentially rewritten the Securities Act. This complete overhaul of
the legislative act could easily be viewed by a court as beyond the scope
of what Congress envisaged when it granted the SEC authority to create
"exemptions."
More specifically, the reforms have wrought a crucial number of
changes to the Securities Act itself. Whereas section 5(c) mandates no
pre-filing communication, the reforms now freely allow WKSIs to com-
municate.309 Perhaps WKSIs could be seen as simply a class of people
exempted from the provision of section 5(c). But WKSIs account for
almost the entire equity and debt securities market in the United
States.310 To exempt WKSIs from section 5(c) is to exempt almost the
entire market, or, stated otherwise, to delete section 5(c) from the Securi-
ties Act.
308. See Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3.
309. See discussion supra Part II.A.
310. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,727 (Aug. 3, 2005).
2007]
604 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 56:561
Whereas section 5(b)(1) requires that only a prospectus that contains
statutorily mandated information be used to advertise securities to the
public during the waiting period, the reforms have now allowed for al-
most all issuers to advertise their securities using whatever written infor-
mation they want.3 ' Again, this is tantamount to deleting section 5(b)(1).
Whereas 5(b)(2) mandates that sales of securities are not allowed until
the investor received a physical copy of the information in the statutory
prospectus, the reforms allow the filing of the document with the SEC to
constitute delivery to the investor. 2 Once again, this is potentially
equivalent to deleting section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act.
Finally, whereas section 5 generally requires companies to register their
securities and respect the various communications restrictions that apply
when conducting an offering, the reforms have now authorized WKSIs to
conduct automatic registrations in which, upon filing a brief registration
document, those WKSIs will essentially be able to sell securities upon
demand. Again, this dramatic reform of the basic provision of the Securi-
ties Act could easily be seen as beyond the scope of section 28 where the
SEC is only given authority to craft exemptions.
(b) The Reforms May Not Be Consistent With the Protection of Inves-
tors
There is, however, crucial limiting language found in section 28 of the
Securities Act: administrative action by the SEC must be taken in accor-
dance with the public interest and consistent with the protection of inves-
tors.3 It is difficult to assess what the economic consequences of the
newly enacted reforms will be, and therefore, whether they are indeed in
the interest of the public and consistent with the protection of investors.
Nonetheless, as this Article has pointed out, there are many areas where
the reforms on their face seem to oppose the interests of investor protec-
tion and instead are more concerned with providing ease of access to the
capital markets for issuers and a relaxation of liability standards that
would have otherwise applied to offering participants.
Again, where the reforms have allowed for much more and freer com-
munication from issuers and others marketing a new issuance of securi-
ties and the public, investor protection seems to have been sacrificed for
the interests of those marketing their securities. The restrictions on
communications during a securities offering were always founded on pro-
tecting the investors from the hyperbole that is expected from parties
hyping new securities. To remove those restrictions and allow such free
communications hardly seems consistent with investor protection. Simi-
311. See discussion supra Part II.B.
312. See discussion supra Part III.C.
313. See Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3.
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larly, allowing WKSIs to automatically register any securities that they
wish to sell at any time without SEC approval hardly seems consistent
with investor protection. SEC approval and registration had been re-
quired in the past specifically to protect investors. Dismantling the regu-
latory system that has protected investors in the past in the name of im-
proving efficiency and access to capital markets is not in accord with sec-
tion 28, which demands that the SEC act to protect investors.
VI. CONCLUSION: INVESTOR PROTECTION SHOULD BE PARAMOUNT
The SEC's website sets forth its mission: "The mission of the U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. 3 14 The
website goes on to explain that its mission is now more important than
ever because more and more Americans are investing in the markets to
help plan for their futures and their children's futures.315 This Article has
sought to explain and analyze the complex set of reforms that the SEC
adopted in December 2005, in light of that mission statement.
While the SEC has declared that investor protection is paramount, it
has adopted reforms that undo much of the regulatory regime that the
Securities Act sought to establish. The Securities Act was premised on
the idea that as long as investors had access to quality, balanced informa-
tion about an upcoming issuance of securities, then they could fairly
make an investment decision with respect to that potential purchase. The
Securities Act was highly suspicious of the communications that issuers
and other marketers of securities might publish in an attempt to promote
the sales of their securities. Accordingly, the Securities Act restricted
communications during a registered offering to very limited factual mat-
ters (such as those allowed by Rule 135, tombstones ads, and identifying
statements), in addition to the statutorily mandated information filed in
the registration statement.
The main written selling document allowed during a registered offering
was the prospectus, and it was a part of the registration statement making
it subject to a high standard of joint and several liability under section 11
for misleading statements. This strict regulation on the flow of informa-
tion, and the heightened liability associated with the information, was
specifically designed by Congress to protect investors and combat the
natural tendency of promoters to hype their securities in an effort to gen-
erate more proceeds.
The SEC has undone much of this regulatory regime with its reforms.
According to the SEC, the reforms are necessary in order to keep up with
modern developments in the markets, reporting standards under the Ex-
314. About the SEC, supra note 295.
315. Id.
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change Act, and technology."6 The SEC has stressed that technological
developments such as the Internet have increased both (i) the market's
demand for timely information and (ii) the ability of issuers to meet that
demands. The reforms that were adopted are, according to the SEC,
meant to meet that demand, make access to capital easier and perhaps
less costly for issuers, and preserve investor protection.318
The SEC undertook a cost-benefit analysis of its reforms in its adopting
release. There, the SEC continued to reiterate that its reforms were de-
signed to improve the capital formation process and still preserve inves-
tor protection. 9 Still, there is scant hard evidence that investors' inter-
ests are being protected at all. Although the reforms include additional
disclosure requirements for Exchange Act reports, few of the main as-
pects of the reforms seem targeted to the protection of investors.32 ° On
the contrary, most of the reforms seem designed to make it easier for
issuers and other parties involved in a registered offering to sell the secu-
rities that are the subject of that offering.
However, nowhere in the adopting release is there any evidence that
investors will continue to enjoy the protection against potentially mis-
leading information that existed before the reforms were adopted. In
fact, it seems intuitive that the technological advancements that the SEC
claims are driving this reform effort actually make restricting communica-
tions more important than ever. Indeed, with the ability of issuers and
others marketing new securities to use the Internet, the potential to dis-
seminate false or misleading communications about upcoming securities
has increased dramatically. In the face of those risks, and in the wake of
many large-scale corporate scandals in the late 1990s and early part of
this century, the SEC has deemed it appropriate, indeed somehow neces-
sary, to deregulate communications pertaining to securities offerings.
This Article has described and analyzed the reforms but has gone on to
also question whether the SEC has the appropriate authority to make this
kind of sweeping amendment to an act of Congress. As we have seen,
administrative agencies are normally tasked with the promulgation of
discrete, detail-oriented regulations that fill in the gaps left by broader
legislative enactments made by Congress. In addition, such agencies are
not allowed to go beyond the express delegation of authority made to
them by Congress. Section 28 of the Securities Act empowers the SEC to
316. Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,726.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 44,725.
319. Id. at 44,792-95.
320. For example, the reforms include provisions that will increase the information
disclosed in annual and other similar reports under the Exchange Act to include (i) in-
vestment risk factors, (ii) unresolved SEC staff comments on any issuer filings, and (iii)
status as a voluntary filer. Id. at 44,786-88.
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create any exemptions from the enforcement of the Securities Act regula-
tions for certain people, securities, or transactions deemed to be in the
public interest and consistent with investor protection. It is very possible
that this congressional grant of authority is an overbroad delegation of
legislative authority that does not comport with the Constitution. Even if
section 28 is a legitimate delegation of power, the SEC may have over-
stepped its bounds by doing more than just exempting small classes of
people, securities, or transactions, but instead effectively rewriting the
Securities Act altogether.
Finally, the SEC may have violated its congressional mandate in sec-
tion 28 by not crafting regulations that pay enough heed to the interest of
the public and the protection of investors. As scholars have mentioned
generally in regards to administrative agencies, it is very easy for such
agencies to end up serving organized interests- the interests of those
whom the agency regulates-and not the broader dispersed interests of
321
others, like the investing public that the SEC was organized to serve.
321. Stewart, supra note 271, at 1684-86.
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